Perhaps the most prominent current definition of (actual) causality is due to Halpern and Pearl. It is defined using causal models (also known as structural equations models). We abstract the definition, extracting its key features, so that it can be applied to any other model where counterfactuals are defined. By abstracting the definition, we gain a number of benefits. Not only can we apply the definition in a wider range of models, including ones that allow, for example, backtracking, but we can apply the definition to determine if A is a cause of B even if A and B are formulas involving disjunctions, negations, beliefs, and nested counterfactuals (none of which can be handled by the Halpern-Pearl definition). Moreover, we can extend the ideas to getting an abstract definition of explanation that can be applied beyond causal models. Finally, we gain a deeper understanding of features of the definition even in causal models.

Counterfactual reasoning arises in broad array of fields, from statistics to economics to law. Not surprisingly, there has been a great deal of work on giving semantics to counterfactuals. Perhaps the best-known approach is due to Lewis [1973] and Stalnaker [1968], and involves possible worlds. The idea is that a counterfactual of the form "ifAwere the case thenB would be the case", typically written A B, is true at a worldwifB is true at all the worlds closest tow whereAis true. Of course, making this precise requires having some notion of "closeness" among worlds. More recently, Pearl [2000] proposed the use of causal models based on structural equations for reasoning about causality. In causal models, we can examine the effect of interventions, and answer questions of the form "if random variable X were set to x, what would the value of random variable Y be". This suggests that causal models can also provide semantics for (at least some) counterfactuals. The relationship between the semantics of counterfactuals in causal models and in counterfactual structures (i.e., possible-worlds structures where the semantics of counterfactuals is given in terms of A preliminary version of this paper appears in the Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR 2010), 2010.

Galles and Pearl [1998] claimed that ``for recursive models, the causal model framework does not add any restrictions to counterfactuals, beyond those imposed by Lewis's [possible-worlds] framework.''  This claim is shown to be false.  Indeed, the opposite claim is true: recursive models are shown to correspond precisely to a subclass of (possible-world) counterfactual structures.  On the other hand, a slight generalization of recursive models, models where all equations have unique solutions, is shown to be incomparable in expressive power to counterfactual structures, despite the fact that the Galles and Pearl arguments should apply to them as well.  The problem with the Galles and Pearl argument is identified: an axiom that they viewed as irrelevant, because it involved disjunction (which was not in their language), is not irrelevant at all.